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CONFLICT OF LAWS-CURRENCY RESTRICTIONS-
CUBAN EXCHYANGE-CONTROL LAws H]i NOT To GoVERN CASHa-
SURRENDER PROVISION OF INSURANCE POICOY PURCHASED THmRE
FORt NATIONAL WHO LATER FLED TO UNITED STATES
In 1944 plaintiff's mother purchased an insurance policy on the life
of plaintiff from the Cuban office of a Canadian insurer. Plaintiff and her
mother were both Cuban nationals and the policy, which was written in
Spanish, was negotiated and delivered in Cuba. Pursuant to the mother's
request, however, the policy stipulated that all premiums and benefits were
to be paid in United States dollars. The policy also contained a cash-
surrender option which provided that a guaranteed value in dollars would
be paid to the policyholder "upon legal surrender of this policy to the
Company for cancellation." There were no restrictions in the policy which
required the policyholder to exercise this option in Cuba or which in any
way confined to Cuba the insurer's obligation to tender payment of the
surrender value. Premiums were paid in dollars in Cuba 1 until 1951, after
which time Cuban law required payment of former dollar obligations to be
made in pesos. From 1951 to 1960, premiums were apparently paid in
pesos in Cuba.2 In the latter year plaintiff fled from Cuba as a political
refugee and, after taking up residence in Georgia, attempted to exercise
the cash-surrender option by mailing the policy to a branch office of the
insurer in Pennsylvania. When the insurer refused to pay the obligation
in dollars, plaintiff brought suit in Pennsylvania for the guaranteed dollar
value of the option. While the suit was pending, plaintiff resettled in
Florida.8 The insurer contended that Cuban law governed the entire policy
and required that payment of the option be made in pesos in Cuba. The
court, rejecting this defense, held Cuban law inapplicable, reasoning that
the option was a continuous and irrevocable offer acceptable, by implica-
tion from the terms of the policy and the surrounding circumstances,4 in
the United States as well as in Cuba. Since by mailing her policy to
IThe policy allowed plaintiff to pay premiums to the insurer's home office or
to any other acceptable place. Instant case at 182, 203 A.2d at 508.
2There was some question in the record whether plaintiff had paid premiums in
dollars or pesos after 1951. Instant case at 187, 203 A.2d at 511. Even if the insured
had paid in dollars, however, under Cuban law the insurer would nevertheless have
been credited only with a peso amount upon deposit of the premiums in a Cuban bank.
Ibid.
3 Appellant's Petition for Allowance of Appeal, p. 2.
4 These included: (1) the fact the insurer was not Cuban; (2) the provision for
payment in United States dollars; (3) the presence of a corporate residence of the
insurer in Pennsylvania; and (4) the absence of any policy limitation upon "per-
formance of the option." Instant case at 187-88, 203 A.2d at 511.
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defendant's Pennsylvania office plaintiff "accepted" the option in Pennsyl-
vania, the court considered that state to be the place both of execution and
performance of the option. Pennsylvania law was thus held to govern
the transaction and the insurer was held to be obliged to pay plaintiff in
dollars in the United States.5 Varas v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 204 Pa.
Super. 176, 203 A.2d 505 (1964). 6
For choice of law purposes, payment of an obligation has traditionally
been classified as a matter of performance and thus subsumed under the
general rule that such matters are governed by the law of the place of
performance. 7 Under this approach, the relevant inquiry to be made
by the forum is that of where the contract was performed or was to be
performed. Utilization of such a test in Varas presents several problems.
It is not immediately clear whether the insured's demand for the guaranteed
value or the insurer's tender of payment should fix the "place of per-
formance." If, as the Varas court apparently believed, the insured's
"performance" is conclusive, the court must initially determine in which
state an acceptance mailed from Georgia to Pennsylvania takes effect.
Similarly, if tender of payment by the insurer is determinative, the court
must first decide in which of the several possible jurisdictions the insurer
was obliged to "pay" the option.8 The formalistic nature of these inquiries
5The court did not specify where within the United States the insurer was
obliged to tender payment. See note 8 infra and accompanying text.
6 Under the relevant portion of the Bretton Woods Agreement, Agreement Be-
tveen the United States and Other Powers Respecting the International Monetary
Fund, Dec. 20, 1945, art. VIII, para. 2(b), 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501 (effective
Dec. 27, 1945), to which the United States still adheres, the United States would
arguably have been obliged to recognize Cuban exchange-control laws in Varas.
See Theye y Ajuria v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 450 (La. Ct. App.
1963) (IMF Agreement requires recognition), rev'd, 245 La. 755, 161 So. 2d 70
(contract similar to that in Varas not a "foreign exchange contract" within the
meaning of the IMF Agreement), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 997 (1964). See generally
Meyer, Recognition of Exchange Controls After the International Monetary Fund
Agreement, 62 YALE L.J. 867, 880-97 (1953). Since the agreement is only binding
in regard to member nations, the point has been rendered moot by Cuba's withdrawal
on April 2, 1964. Instant case at 180, 203 A.2d at 507.
7 Freutel, Exchange Control, Freezing Orders and the Conflict of Laws, 56
Hmv. L. REv. 30, 37 (1942):
Since the payment restrictions affect the legality and possibility of perform-
ance rather than the essential validity of the contract, the relevant choice
of law rule is that which deals with matters of performance. The prevailing
Anglo-American rule is that such matters, including excuses for nonperform-
ance, are governed by the lex loci solutionis [law of the place of performance].
(Footnote omitted.)
See, e.g., Central Hanover Banking & Trust Co. v. Siemens & Halske Aktiengesell-
schaft, 15 F. Supp. 927 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd inem., 84 F2d 993 (2d Cir.), cert. deied,
299 U.S. 585 (1936); Pan-Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Recio, 154 So. 2d 197 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 156 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 990
(1964) (facts similar to instant case) ; Kraus v. Zivnostenska Banka, 187 Misc. 681,
64 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ; South Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Columbia Petroleum
Co., 177 Misc. 756, 31 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Larn v. United Steel Works
Corp., 166 Misc. 465, 1 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
8 Under the facts in Varas, this could conceivably be Georgia, from where plaintiff
mailed her demand for the cash-surrender value, Florida, her present residence, or
Pennsylvania, the forum. See Appellant's Petition for Allowance of Appeal, p. 2.
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reinforces the conclusion that mechanical reference to the law of the "place
of performance" is unfounded.
The place of performance rule suffers not only from a possible difficulty
in ascertaining the "place of performance," but also from an unconvincing
rationale. The rule is said to be based upon the belief that such matters
as properly fall thereunder are "minute" details not considered to be of
any real significance by the parties, or that they concern "details . .
of primary concern to the state where the acts involving them are done." 10
The first rationale is clearly inapplicable here, as plaintiff's mother spe-
cifically requested that the policy be paid in dollars,1 while the second
justification is but a conclusion which should at best be treated as a
presumption rebuttable upon presentation of contrary evidence. Likewise,
even if it is assumed that the option was truly a "Pennsylvania contract"
as held by the court, reference to the law of Pennsylvania solely on that
basis is also inadequate. Where the contacts with a transaction are spread
over several states, the fact that it might be technically accurate to find that
the relevant contract was "made" in any one of them does not of itself
conclusively establish that such state possesses the most valid claim to
have its law applied to the transaction.'2
A more helpful approach to the choice of law problems presented in
Varas is found in the "most significant contacts" doctrine. 13 Under this
approach, which was adopted for tort cases in Pennsylvania shortly after
the Varas decision in Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.,14 the relevant
inquiry becomes the more meaningful one of which jurisdiction has the
most interest in the litigation. 15 The law to be chosen is that of "the juris-
diction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence
or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in
the litigation." 10
Although the "most significant contacts" doctrine correctly focuses
upon the interests of the concerned jurisdictions, its literal application
9 
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS, Reporter's Note § 346b (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1960).
10 Id. § 346b, comment a.
"lInstant case at 182, 203 A.2d at 508.
12 Consider, for example, the case posed if a Cuban citizen and resident had
mailed a demand for the surrender value from Cuba to the Pennsylvania office of
the insurer.
13 See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E2d 279, 240 N.Y.S2d
743 (1963) ; Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
14416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
15 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963);
Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954); cf. Hartford Acc.
& Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 150 (1934). Under this
approach, mere conflict of laws presents no choice of law problem; such a problem
arises only where there is a conflict of interests. Currie, in Comments on Babcock
v. Jackson, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1212, 1235 (1963); Currie, The Disinterested Third
State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754, 756 (1963); see Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55
Cal. 2d 588, 360 P2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961) (Traynor, 3.); Babcock v.
Jackson, supra.
16 Id. at 481, 191 N.E.2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S2d at 749.
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could present unnecessary problems. Difficulties might arise where the
interests of the concerned jurisdictions were so nearly balanced as to pose
fine problems of relative weight. A preliminary question in such a situa-
tion is whether the forum can constitutionally decline to decide whose
interest is "greatest" and apply the law of any interested state. Although
in Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co.' 7 the Supreme
Court arguably held that a forum could not apply its law to a foreign
transaction unless its interests outweighed those of the foreign state,'8 this
decision has been criticized both on its facts and on its reasoning.' 9 The
present rule is substantially more liberal. In Richards v. United States,"°
for example, the Court held that "where more than one State has suffi-
ciently substantial contact with the activity in question, the forum State,
by analysis of the interests possessed by the States involved, could con-
stitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of one or another
state having such an interest in the multistate activity." 21 Thus, in Varas,
Pennsylvania could constitutionally apply the law of any jurisdiction which
possessed a significant interest in the transaction.P
If the focus is to be upon conflicting interests, the Pennsylvania forum
in Varas is faced with two distinct choice of law issues. The first involves
a conflict between the interests of Cuba and those of the forum. Under
Pennsylvania law, the Varas option is payable in dollars in the United
States; Cuban law, however, would require payment to be made in pesos
in Cuba.
The nature of the Cuban interest in having its law applied in Varas is
most easily explained by reference to recent Cuban economic history.
When the Varas policy was issued, Cuba had a dual currency system with
17292 U.S. 143 (1934).
18 A legislative policy which attempts to draw to the state of the forum
control over the obligations of contracts elsewhere validly consummated and
to convert them for all purposes into contracts of the forum regardless of the
relative importance of the interests of the forum as contrasted with those
created at the place of the contract, conflicts with the guaranties of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
Id. at 150; see Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). In the same paragraph,
however, the Delta & Pine Court pointed out that "the interest of the forum has
but slight connection with the substance of the contract obligations," suggesting the
possibility of a different result had the forum's interest been adjudged substantial.
19 See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 220 (1960) (Black, J., dis-
senting) ; Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAw & CONTEIM.
PROB. 706, 722-23 (1963).
20 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
211d. at 15. (Footnote omitted.)
22The requirement of "sufficiently substantial contact with the activity in ques-
tion," see text accompanying note 21 supra, even if separable from the interest require-
ment, would appear to have been met by all the relevant jurisdictions in Varas-Cuba
as the original "place of contracting," Pennsylvania as the "place of performance"
and the insurer's branch office, and Florida as the residence of the policyholder.
On residence as a sufficient "contact"' with the transaction, see Babcock v. Jackson,
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (New York damages law
applied to automobile accident in Ontario; both parties New York residents and car
garaged within state); cf. McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Bd., 390 P.2d 412, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 636, appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 85 Sup. Ct.
278 (1964).
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the dollar and the peso both legal tender.23 In 1948, however, Cuba
enacted legislation establishing a National Bank and depriving the dollar
of its official status.2 4 To give the public time to adjust to the new system,
a subsequent presidential decree continued the dollar as legal tender until
June 30, 1951, after which time all contract obligations enforceable in
Cuba were to be paid in pesos.2 5 These measures were apparently taken
to end peso inflation in foreign exchange markets.26 It was not until 1959,
however, that Cuba turned to detailed regulation of currency transactions.
The legislation which followed 2 7 was designed to end the severe monetary
difficulties caused by the continued instability of the peso.8 On the
domestic level fluctuations in the value of the peso had induced Cubans
to seek out dollars for private savings, and a lively black market in dollars
had developed.20 This had two results. First, it served to impair stabiliza-
tion efforts by destroying public confidence in the peso. More significantly,
it resulted in a severe public shortage of dollars. 0 Since Cuban foreign
trade had traditionally been conducted in dollars,31 this reduced the Govern-
ment's ability to make strategic purchases abroad. Against this background
of domestic and international financial problems, Cuba adopted the com-
prehensive exchange-control regulations mentioned above. Supplementing
the 1948 and 1951 laws, the key legislation provided that: (1) all transfers
of foreign currency from abroad should be made through the National
23 N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1959, p. 5, col. 2; id., Dec. 23, 1948, p. 6, col. 5.
2 4 Law No. 13 of Dec. 23, 1948 (Cuba) ; see N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1948, p. 6, col. 5.
25 Presidential Decree No. 1384 of April 9, 1951 (Cuba); see N.Y. Times,
April 6, 1951, p. 11, col. 1.
26 See id., Dec. 23, 1948, p. 6, col. 5.
27A fairly complete summary of this legislation may be found in 11 IMF ANN.
REP. ON EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS 93-97 (1960); 12 IMF ANN. REP. ON ExCHANGE
RESTRICTIONS 93-96 (1961); 13 IMF ANN. REP. ON ExCHANGE REsTRICTIONS 89-92
(1962).
23This inflation was brought on by such factors as reserve depletion, see N.Y.
Times, Feb. 12, 1959, p. 9, col. 4 (reserves below legal requirements); id., Aug. 9,
1959, § 1, p. 16, col. 3 (foreign reserves nearly depleted at Castro's entry); id.,
April 23, 1959, p. 2, col. 6 (United States economists predict Cuban gold and silver
reserves will run out by September or October), balance of payments deficits, see
id., Feb. 12, 1959, p. 9, col. 4, capital flight, see ibid., and counterfeiting, see id.,
Aug. 6, 1961, § 1, p. 1, col. 4 (exchange of old pesos for new ones ordered because
of fear of foreign counterfeiting). The flight of Batista officials with large quantities
of pesos they sold abroad at discounts also contributed to peso instability. See id.,
Jan. 29, 1959, p. 8, col. 6; id., April 5, 1960, p. 17, col. 2 (Mexican lawyer who
attempted to sell two hundred million pesos at discount linked to Batista by Cuban
official); cf. id., Feb. 20, 1959, p. 5, col. 2 (Cuban banks requested United States
banks not to pay dollars for large Cuban bills).
29 See id., April 5, 1960, p. 17, col. 2.
30 See id., Dec. 7, 1960, p. 12, col. 1 (dollar reserves virtually exhausted); id.,
March 16, 1961, p. 9, col. 1 (passage of laws motivated by "the acute shortage of
foreign exchange, particularly of United States dollars"). Before the enactment of
compulsory redemption laws, the Cuban Government -went to unusual lengths in its
attempt to replenish its dollar reserves. It employed all methods of communication
from television to public speeches to urge its nationals to deliver even American
pennies to the National Bank, see id., Oct 1, 1959, p. 20, col. 5, and at one point even
offered to give houses to the Cuban workers at the Guantanamo Bay American
Naval Base if they would exchange their weekly dollar salaries for pesos. See id.,
Nov. 17, 1960, p. 17, col. 3.
3lId., Feb. 20, 1959, p. 5, col. 2.
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Bank and be paid to the recipients in pesos at an official exchange rate; 3 2
(2) all foreign currency, however obtained, should be exchanged for pesos
at the National Bank within ten days of acquisition; 83 and (3) all un-
authorized dealings in foreign or national currency would be punished by
imprisonment, fine, or both.84 Specifically prohibited under the latter
regulation were the exporting of any currency, foreign or national,3 5 and
the establishment of peso credits "for those residing abroad." 36
The first two laws discussed above were to have a dual effect; the first
aspect would end the circulation of foreign exchange within Cuba. This
would serve to foreclose the possibility that nationals would aggravate
stabilization difficulties by seeking out such currencies at unfavorable ex-
change rates. Moreover, requiring foreign exchange to be turned over to
the National Bank would help Cuba solve its short-run foreign trade
problems by providing it with more stable currencies with which to con-
duct its trade. The permanent solution to the foreign trade problem lay, of
course, in stabilization of the domestic currency, a result which under
ordinary circumstances would result in pesos becoming an acceptable
medium of exchange. Viewed in this light, the requirement that all Cuban
obligations be paid in pesos could also be considered an attempt to coerce
foreign corporations to support Cuban stabilization efforts, as the business
needs of these corporations for pesos would increase the demand for the
currency. Prohibiting the establishment of peso accounts to be held by
foreign residents is a measure which works in conjunction with the regula-
tion of currency exporting to end capital flight, a basic source of the Cuban
difficulties in 1959.s3 Taken together, the practical effect of these regula-
tions is to require a Cuban debtor to pay all obligations in pesos in Cuba,
for the first regulation prohibits payment by peso credit abroad, and the
last effectively renders payment by foreign exchange abroad impossible,
as no foreign currency is permitted to leave the country.
In light of these regulations, a decision by the Varas court that Cuban
law governed the option would necessitate payment in pesos in Cuba. Such
a result would further the Cuban interests embodied in the exchange-
control regulations :38 it would prevent circulation of foreign currency in
32 Law No. 930 of Feb. 23, 1961, art. 23, [1961] 29 Leyes del Gobierno Pro-
visional de la Revoluci6n 25 (Cuba) [hereinafter cited as Law No. 930]. 13 IMF
ANN. REP. ON ExCHANGE RESTRiCTIONS 91 (1962) summarizes the most important
provisions of this law.
33 Law No. 930, art. 23, at 25.
3 4 Law No. 568 of Sept. 23, 1959, art. 2, [1959] 12 Leyes del Gobierno Provi-
sional de la Revoluci6n 343-44 (Cuba) [hereinafter cited as Law No. 568]. Portions
of this law are translated in Comment, 18 U. MIAMI L. REv. 455, 460 n.31 (1963).
35 Law No. 568, art. 1, §§ 6-7, at 342. Law No. 930, art. 42, at 30-31 contains
similar provisions.
36 Law No. 568, art 1, § 8, at 343.
37 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1959, p. 9, col. 4.
33 It is not clear whether such a result would increase Cuba's foreign exchange
reserves, as the insurer would most probably have pesos on hand in Cuba, and would
thus not need to conduct a foreign exchange transaction with the Cuban Bank to
obtain them.
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Cuba, assure that the wealth represented by the option payment would
not leave the country, and increase the demand for pesos.
In the face of the Cuban interest delineated above, the confines of due
process require that Pennsylvania demonstrate a substantial interest in
the Varas transaction if it is to apply its own law. In its status as an
American state, it would appear that Pennsylvania possesses the requisite
interest and should apply its law. In contrast to the typical choice of law
situation, however, the relevant interest in Varas is not simply a local
one, but may rather be described most accurately as a national foreign
policy interest. The United States and Cuba are presently in a state of
economic warfare. The United States has proclaimed a nearly total em-
bargo in trade with Cuba,3 9 and has prohibited the importing of any goods
made or derived in whole or in part from goods of Cuban origin.4 0 It has,
furthermore, prohibited assistance, except under special circumstances, to
any country aiding Cuba.41 Most significantly, on July 8, 1963, the State
Department announced that the Treasury had imposed certain restrictions
in financial transactions with Cuba which would "contribute further to the
economic isolation of Cuba." 42 Where an insurer was obliged to make
a policy payment to a Cuban national, these regulations authorized such
payment only if made through deposits in a blocked account in a United
States bank.43 Payment in Cuba was thus prohibited. Other regulations
prohibited, without special license, "all transactions in foreign exchange
by any person within the United States" involving "any . . . payment
of an obligation expressed in terms of the currency of Cuba .... " 44
This would apparently preclude an insurer from making payment in pesos
in the United States.
Even if it assumed that these Treasury Regulations are not expressly
applicable in Varas,45 at the very least they demonstrate a national interest
in preventing the transmission of funds to Cuba and the payment of
39 See U.S. DE'T OF STATE FOR SENATE COMM. oN FOREIGN RELATIONS, 88TH
CONG., 1ST SEss., EVENTS IN UNITED STATES-CUBAN REATIONs 21 (Comm. Print
1963) (this action was taken on February 3, 1961). This publication contains a
complete chronology of events in United States-Cuban relations from July 25, 1957,
to January 7, 1963.
40 Id. at 21 (March 24, 1961).
41 Id. at 20 (Sept. 7, 1961).
4 2 Dep't State Press Release No. 360, July 8, 1963, 49 Dz'T STATE BULL. 160
(1963).
43 Treas. Reg. § 515.526(b) (2) (1963).
4 4 Treas. Reg. §§ 515.201(a) (2), .309 (1963).
4 5 Two arguments might be advanced against applying the regulations in Varar.
To begin with, it is possible to maintain that a Cuban refugee is not a Cuban national
for purposes of the insurance regulation, thus leaving the Varas option outside the
regulatory pale. See Treas. Reg. § 515.302 (1963). A broader argument against
the application of either regulation would focus upon the origins of the regulations
and the nationality of the insurer. Since the regulations represented a foreign policy
judgment of the United States, the argument would run, the court could not be
certain whether the State Department intended to subject the operations of a Cana-
dian insurer doing business in the United States to their terms. Under such an
approach, literal meaning -would be of no aid. Because Canadian sensibilities might
be offended by an automatic application of the regulations in Varas, it would follow
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obligations in pesos. This interest is grounded upon the view that such
results would aid Cuban economic recovery, and thus strengthen a nation
considered a peril to domestic ideals. The regulations, embodying a policy
of economic warfare, point to a choice of law which will frustrate Cuban
exchange-control goals. Selection of Pennsylvania law will advance this
national interest since, as shown in Varas, it will result in the policy being
paid in dollars in the United States.
Because the interest delineated above is a national one, it might be
contended that the Pennsylvania forum lacks the requisite interest to justify
application of its local law. Such an objection misconstrues the nature of a
national interest. To say there is a national concern in the Varas transac-
tion is to say every American State has an interest in the outcome of the
litigation. The interest in seeing the goals of American foreign policy
implemented is common to all American States, and can thus be invoked
by Pennsylvania to justify application of its law.4
A determination that the Varas option should be paid in dollars in the
United States does not exhaust the choice of law problems presented by
the case. The question of which state's substantive law should measure the
specific contractual obligations created by the transaction still remains.
Resolution of this problem will determine such issues as whether plaintiff's
failure to pay premiums in dollars between 1951 and 1960 should reduce
the surrender value of the policyY 7 In contrast to the choice of law question
discussed above, this question presents a more orthodox conflict of laws
problem, involving exclusively local interests of Canada, Pennsylvania,
and Florida.4 8 In Varas the interest of the forum and of Canada in this
that the court could not apply the regulations without State Department intervention
and clarification. Cf. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945); Rich
v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir.
1961). Because of the approach taken in the text, it is unnecessary to pass on the
merits of such arguments.
46The same result suggested in the text would also be obtained if the forum,
applying a "most significant contacts" test, found Florida to be the state of the most
significant contacts and simply applied Florida local law to decide where and in
what currency the option would be paid. The use of such an approach, however,
would be inadvisable, for it would fail to demonstrate that the national interest in
seeing American foreign policy goals implemented was the actual basis of the decision
that the option should be paid in dollars in the United States. By failing to make
this explicit, the court would make it appear that its decision was based upon the
local interests of Florida. That this is not so is shown by the possibility that Florida,
if it had jurisdiction in Varas, would apply Cuban law. If the interest protected
by the forum were only a local Florida interest, such a Florida decision would be
persuasive authority for choosing Cuban law to resolve the question of where and
in what currency the option should be paid. See Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,
222 F. Supp. 50, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Since the relevant interest is a national one,
however, the Florida conflicts law which would refer the case to Cuban local law
would not be binding upon a Pennsylvania court. That court would thus be able
to justify application of its own local law by deciding to protect this common interest
47Applying Pennsylvania local law, the lower court in Varas directed a verdict
in favor of plaintiff in the amount of the premiums paid. Varas v. Crown Life Ins.
Co., 83 Montgomery 71 (C.P. Montgomery County, Pa., 1963) (impossibility of
plaintiff's performance in Cuba gives rise to a quasi-contractual obligation on the part
of insurer to pay her the fair value of her prior performance).
48 Since whatever amount plaintiff recovers will be paid in dollars in the United
States, Cuba would have no interest in this aspect of the litigation.
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aspect of the litigation stems from the effect of any judgment upon an
insurer doing business within their borders. Florida's claim, on the other
hand, rests upon the interests created by plaintiff's residence in that State.
In view of their concern with the business affairs of the insurer, there
would be no due process barrier to the application of either Canadian or
Pennsylvania law to determine the substantive rights under the option.49
It would seem more reasonable, however, to apply Florida lawr50 in this
phase of the litigation.
Were Pennsylvania local law to be applied in Varas to determine the
substantive rights under the option, forum-shopping would be encouraged,
for Florida plaintiffs in a Varas situation could avoid the application of
potentially stringent Florida law merely by mailing their policies into a
more favorable jurisdiction for surrender. Furthermore, the interests of
Canada and Pennsylvania in the outcome of Varas are not very weighty.
Requiring a multistate insurer to pay even the full amount of a guaranteed
surrender value would appear to pose little threat to the financial stability
of such an insurer. Florida's interest in the result of this phase of the
litigation would appear to be more substantial. Application of any legal
formula which would reduce plaintiff's recovery will to that extent impair
plaintiff's ability to care for her needs and possibly cast some of that
burden upon the state where she lives. The insured's status as a political
refugee heightens such a possibility. The chance that such an individual
would be forced upon the relief rolls by an adverse judgment would appear
sufficiently substantial for choice of law purposes 5 to warrant the forum
to base its choice of law decision thereupon. This is not to suggest that
49 See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra; cf. Watson v. Employers Liab.
Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 75-76 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
50 For choice of law purposes, "Florida law" should be taken by the forum to be
that law which Florida would apply to determine whether the insured's recovery
would be diminished because of a failure to pay premiums in dollars from 1951 to
1960. Thus, if Florida would refer this question under its conflicts law to Cuban
local law, a forum choosing to apply "Florida law" should do likewise to effectuate
Florida policy. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481-82, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283,
240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749 (1963) ("policy" of most interested jurisdiction should be
applied) ; Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954) (same);
cf. Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 50, 54 (1963). Florida law is
undecided on this point. Compare Confederation Life Ass'n v. Ugalde, 164 So. 2d 1
(Fla.) (holding that Cuban law governed under the IMF Agreement and the place
of performance rule where the contract was performable only in Cuba), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 915 (1964), with Pan-American Life Ins. Co. v. Recio, 154 So. 2d 197
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (Cuban law held inapplicable where contract to be per-
formed in the United States), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 990 (1964).
51 Sixteen of every twenty Cuban refugees entering the country are granted
financial assistance. Subcomm. To Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees
and Escapees of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Cuban Refugee Problem, S. REP.
No. 1328, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1962). Insurance policy provisions like those in
Varas have been a constant source of litigation in the last few years, as the cash-
surrender options appear to be an important source of income to these refugees. In
Florida alone, there have been over ten decided cases in the last two years with some
twenty-nine more now pending. See Appellant's Petition for Allowance of Appeal,
Table of Cases Cited & pp. 27-29. The Cuban refugee problem has been given detailed
consideration in Hearings on the Cuban Refugee Problem Before the Subcommittee
To Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees and Escapees of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, pt. 1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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the forum should select the law of the jurisdiction most favorable to the
insured to govern the general contractual claims posed in Varas. 2  The
implication is rather that Florida, since it will have to bear any govern-
mental burden arising from a judgment adverse to the insured, has the
greatest interest in this aspect of the litigation and should thus be able to
decide the amount of the insured's recovery.P What that recovery would
actually be should be irrelevant under an interests approach to choice
of law.
J-URISDICTION-NEw YoRK LoNGARm STATuTE HnD CoN-
STiTUTIONAiLY To ExTEND JumsmcIO OvF FoREIGx CoRpo-
RATION IN PRODUCTS LIABInTY CASE
Defendant corporation manufactured an "unbreakable" geologist's
hammer in Illinois and sold it there to a New York dealer. Plaintiff's
aunt purchased the hammer from the dealer in New York and gave it to
plaintiff, a New York resident, who was injured when the hammer broke
during use in Connecticut. An action was brought in a New York state
court for negligence and tortious breach of warranty.' Section 302(a)
of the recently enacted New York Civil Practice Law and Rules provides:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomi-
ciliary . . . as to a cause of action arising from any of the acts
enumerated in this section, in the same manner as if he were a
domiciliary of this state, if, in person or through an agent, he:
2. commits a tortious act within the state ....
Finding that "circulation in New York of the dangerous instrument
mislabelled" 2 was a tortious act under the statute,3 the commission of
52 But see Blanco v. Pan-Am. Life Ins. Co., 221 F. Supp. 219, 228 (S.D. Fla.
1963) (law of insurer's American domicile selected in order to "protect insureds
from the greater power of insurors [sic]").
3 Cf. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954) ; Pearson
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131, 144 (2d Cir.) (Kaufman, J., dissenting),
modified with dissenting opinion adopted, 309 F2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962). (en banc),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
1 Under New York law, "a breach of warranty . . . is a tortious wrong suable
by a noncontracting party whose use of the warranted article is within the reasonable
contemplation of the vendor or manufacturer." Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument
Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436, 191 N.E.2d 81, 82, 240 N.Y.S2d 592, 594 (1963). See
generally 33 FORDHA3 L. REv. 327, 332-33 (1964).
2 Instant case at 290, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 221. Although the court mentioned several
times the "unbreakable" marking on the hammer, the same analysis should be ap-
plicable under New York law if there were no express warranty, for "implicit in
putting such articles on the market are representations that they -will safely do the
job for which they were built." Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., supra
note 1, at 437, 191 N.E.2d at 83, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
3 Noting that the statute does not require that the cause of action arise in New
York, but only that it arise from the commission of a tortious act there, the court
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which satisfied the due process requirement of minimum contacts with the
forum state, the court held that defendant was subject to personal juris-
diction in New York. Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250
N.Y.S.2d 216 (1964).
The requirements of due process are satisfied when a state court
exercises personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant having such
contacts with the forum state that the maintenance of the suit is consistent
with traditional notions of reasonableness and fairness. This "minimum
contacts test" was first articulated in International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington,4 in which the Supreme Court affirmed a personal judgment for
unpaid taxes based upon the foreign corporate defendant's employment of
sales solicitors within the forum state.
Previous to International Shoe, only defendants who could be served
within the forum-natural persons present or domiciled 5 in the state or
corporations "doing business"" there-could be subjected to personal
jurisdiction in the absence of consent. The Supreme Court had, however,
found two exceptions to this rule. In Hess v. Pawloski,7 the Court
sustained jurisdiction over a nonresident individual on a claim arising out
of his operation of a motor vehicle within the forum state. This exception
indulged in a somewhat strained effort to fit the facts of the instant case within the
statutory language:
But there are some breaches of duty which create a continuing condition
of hazard to users, very much like an enjoinable nuisance which may ground
a cause of action short of the harm having yet occurred . . . .In the case
of an instrument defective in construction or dangerous because mislabelled
the hazard persists wherever and so long as the product circulates.
Instant case at 289, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 221. Previous state cases have interpreted
similar single-act clauses as applicable when only the injury occurs in the forum
state. E.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
435-36, 176 N.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1961); cf. Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
258 Minn. 571, 577-80, 104 N.W.2d 888, 892-94 (1960). Insofar as this is merely a
problem of state law and statutory construction, it is beyond the scope of this com-
ment. See generally 33 FoRDHAm L. REv. 327, 333-34 (1964).
4 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5 A domiciliary of the forum state is subject to personal jurisdiction in its
courts, even if he is absent from the state at the time of the commencement of the
action. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
6A corporation was "doing business" in the forum state when, through agents
present there, it engaged in continuous systematic activities amounting, in the case
of sales efforts, to more than mere solicitation. See, e.g., International Harvester
Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). "Doing business" was originally
justified as a basis for personal jurisdiction by the forum state's power to exclude
foreign corporations engaged in intrastate commercial activities. A corporation's
decision to do business in the state was viewed as implying its consent to suit there
on claims arising out of its forum activities, whereas the appointment of a local agent
to receive service as required by many statutes was held to constitute express consent
to suit in the forum on any claim. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining
& Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917). The consent rationale was occasionally supple-
mented by one of "presence"; a corporation which had appointed no local agent might
be subject to personal jurisdiction on a claim which did not arise out of forum
activities "if it is doing business within the State in such manner and to such extent
as to warrant the inference that it is present there." Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v.
McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917). See generally Kurland, The Supreme Court,
the Due Process Clause, and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U.
CIr. L. Rxv. 569, 577-86 (1958).
7274 U.S. 352 (1927).
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was justified by the forum's interest in the safety of its highways, which
could be furthered through the exercise of regulatory power over residents
and nonresidents alike.8 In Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman,9 the
nonresident defendant sold corporate securities as a proprietorship and
operated an office in the forum state through an agent. The Court viewed
this type of business as "exceptional," being subject to special regulation
by the state, and found in the "state interest" concept of Hess support
for upholding personal jurisdiction in a suit for damages arising out of
the defendant's local activities.'
0
Once Hess and Doherty had undercut the doctrine that due process
necessarily required an individual nonresident's presence in the forum at
the commencement of the action, the Supreme Court in International Shoe
found little difficulty in abandoning the "doing business" test with respect
to corporations. Although, under the more flexible minimum contacts
test, continuous and systematic forum activities continue to provide a basis
for jurisdiction in any action brought against a foreign corporation,1 1 the
Court indicated that the test might in some cases permit the exercise of
jurisdiction over any nonresident, individual or corporate, on a claim
arising out of isolated or occasional contacts with the forum. 2 In such
cases the "state interest" approach of Hess and Doherty may supplement
consideration of the substantiality of the defendant's contacts with the
forum.18 The presence of a special state interest in the particular type of
8 As in the case of foreign corporations, the Court found the nonresident motorist's
consent to local suit implied from the state's power to exclude him from its highways.
Id. at 356-57 (citing Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 (1916)). However,
the rationale of implied consent was specifically discarded with respect to nonresident
motorists in Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953). See generally
Kurland, supra note 6, at 576-77.
9 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
1o If the defendant in Doherty had been a corporation, jurisdiction could have
been sustained under the "doing business" test. However, the implied consent rationale
was inapplicable to nonresident natural persons, who could not, because of the privi-
leges and immunities clause, be excluded from commercial activities in the forum.
Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
11 See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) ; Huck
v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 4 Wis. 2d 132, 90 N.W.2d 154 (1958).
12 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). Although
the Supreme Court has had no occasion to apply the minimum contacts test to a
noncorporate defendant, there would seem to be no valid reason for limiting the test
to corporations. Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957)
(dictum) ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (dictum).
See generally Developments in the Law--State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAuv. L. Rxv.
909, 935-37 (1960).
Some state long-arm statutes, like the one in the instant case, are explicitly
applicable to both natural persons and corporations, and courts have upheld the
constitutionality of jurisdiction over a nonresident individual under International
Shoe standards without distinction. See, e.g., State ex rel. Weber v. Register, 67
So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1953); Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
38 The contacts and procedural posture of International Shoe made it a relatively
"easy" case, which might have been resolved solely on the basis of existing precedent
Kurland, supra note 6, at 586-89. Had the contacts been less substantial, it is likely
that the Court would have invoked the state's interest in exercising its taxing power.
Indeed, such a concept of state interest may be implicit in the Court's treatment of
the relationship between the forum's power to lay the taxes and its power to exercise
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claim may make it reasonable to subject the defendant to jurisdiction and
thereby satisfy the requirements of due process.' 4
Thus, although the minimum contacts test is one of reasonableness in
the particular case, this reasonableness is determined by weighing two
objective variables-defendant's contacts and state interest.15  It is true
that the Court's assertion in International Shoe that inconvenience
to the defendant may be considered' has led many authorities to treat
the standard for jurisdiction as nearly equivalent to that of forum non
conveniens.17 But in Hanson v. Denckla,'8 the Court rejected an attempt
to justify personal jurisdiction by convenience alone' 9 and emphasized
the necessity that "there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." 20 Hanson
indicates that the majority of the Court, in mentioning forum convenience
in previous cases,2 ' was primarily concerned with whether the defendant's
jurisdiction to collect them. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
321 (1945). See also Mr. Justice Black's separate opinion, viewing the exercise of
jurisdiction in this case as being so inseparable from the state's taxing power as to
pose no substantial federal question. Id. at 323.
14 See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
15 See Foster, Personal Jurisdiction Based on Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis.
L. Rxv. 522, 542-43.
1International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (dictum)
(citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930) (L.
Hand, J.)).
17 See, e.g., Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry., 166 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand,
J.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948) ; Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sani-
tary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 443-44, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766-67 (1961); Compania De
Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 262, 107 A2d 357, 368 (1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955); cf. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37
TEXAS L. Rxv. 657, 663-64 (1959). But see, e.g., Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp.
539, 544 (D. Minn. 1964).
Some courts, though emphasizing the convenience of the forum with respect to
location of witnesses and the applicable law, have failed to give serious consideration
to the inconvenience to the defendant as a reason for denying jurisdiction:
If in a particular case, trial in an Illinois court will be unduly burdensome
to the nonresident defendant, the doctrine of forum non conveniens is avail-
able. . . . Moreover, the nonresident defendant will in many cases have the
privilege of removal to a Federal court . . . in which case, after removal,
a motion will lie . . . for transfer to a more convenient district.
Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 391, 143 N.E.2d 673, 680 (1957). However, state
courts have shown little inclination, having once determined that they have juris-
diction, to dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens. And, in products
liability cases such as the instant one, the general practice of joining the local retailer
as a defendant will often make removal to a federal court impossible. See Straw-
bridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
18 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
19 [The state court] does not acquire . . . jurisdiction by being the "center
of gravity" of the controversy, or the most convenient location for litigation.
The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law. It is resolved in this
case by considering the acts of the [defendant] ....
Id. at 254.
20 Id. at 253. (Emphasis added.)
21 In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957), and
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950), see text accompanying
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purposeful acts at the time the claim arose invoked sufficient forum benefits
to make it reasonable to impose any future burden of litigating such a
claim in the forum state. Convenience from this standpoint becomes an
alternative way of viewing the defendant's contacts with the forum; the
more substantial the contacts, the more unlikely it is that he will be
unreasonably burdened by litigating there.2 2 Due process would seem to
require that the defendant be able to foresee that his activities might subject
him to suit in the particular foreign forum, and should be independent of
the uncertain conditions which determine forum non conveniens.23 And,
from the standpoint of fair and consistent administration of the minimum
contacts test, there should be an identical and predictable result in all
cases involving similar types of claims and indistinguishable defendant
activities.
The inappropriateness of forum-oriented considerations of convenience
and applicable law is further suggested by the present case, which is unique
among those extending jurisdiction over nonresidents in that neither the
allegedly negligent manufacture nor the injury occurred in the forum state.
Here the witnesses to the injury are in Connecticut, those with knowledge
of the manufacturing process are in Illinois; and, as the present court
acknowledged, under traditional analysis the substantive law to be applied
is that of Connecticut.25 The court recognized that it would not be unfair
to the defendant to disregard the plaintiff's unilateral act of taking the
hammer to Connecticut 26 and inquire only whether the defendant chose
to market its product in New York or could have reasonably foreseen that
it would be sold there. Although certainly a more "convenient" forum,
Connecticut probably could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over
the present defendant.27  Those state and lower federal court decisions
notes 33-34 infra, the Court had earlier discussed the convenience of the forum and
the prohibitive cost of litigation elsewhere to claimants in general. The latter con-
sideration, however, is distinguishable from the forum non conveniens balancing of
specific parties' convenience and can be viewed as one aspect of the special state
interest found in insurance claims. See Note, 104 U. PA. L. Rv. 381, 390-91 (1955).
2 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CoNFLicT OF LAWS, Explanatory Notes § 84, com-
ment c at 92 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
23 See Foster, supra note 15, at 54243; 75 HARv. L. Rav. 1431, 1433 (1962).
2 4 Instant case at 292, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
2
5 RESTATEMENT, CONFLiCr OF LAws § 377 (1934). There is a tendency, how-
ever, to abandon the former inflexible place-of-injury rule for one which permits a
forum which has a substantial interest in or is the "center of gravity" of the litigation
to apply its own law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT or LAws § 379a &
Explanatory Notes (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). Thus it is possible that the court
might apply New York law in the instant case. Cf. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d
473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
26 instant case at 290, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
27 This would surely be so if the defendant did not market its product in Con-
necticut, since the defendant would not have purposefully invoked the forum's benefits,
and the state would have little interest in providing for the redress of a nonresident
plaintiff's claim. In O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568
(1963), the Vermont Supreme Court denied jurisdiction on parallel facts even though
the plaintiff was a forum resident, because it did not appear that any purposeful act
of the defendant was causally responsible for the presence of the allegedly defective
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which seem to focus on the convenience of litigating in the forum where the
injury occurred 2 might have also sustained jurisdiction by emphasizing
the defendant's commercially beneficial activities in the forum and the
foreseeability of injury to the resident plaintiff.29
Where the cause of action arises out of a single commercial transaction
in the forum state, the nonresident defendant's local activity may be
substantial enough to serve as the sole basis for jurisdiction, even in
the absence of any special state interest. Such a case is Compania De
Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co.,30 in which the Maryland Court of
Appeals sustained jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which allegedly
incurred a commercial obligation arising out of an isolated contract made
and negotiated in the forum state with one of its residents and having its
subject matter there. Similarly, in Smyth v. Twin State Improvement
Corp.,3 ' the Supreme Court of Vermont sanctioned jurisdiction over a
foreign corporate defendant whose agent caused property damage by the
negligent performance of work within the forum state. In both cases the
defendant's decision to enter the state and engage in a sizable commercial
transaction, invoking the protection of the forum's laws, assures the
reasonableness of requiring it to litigate there a claim arising directly out
of that transaction.32
At the other extreme are those commercial contacts which are so
tenuous that only an overriding state interest will justify requiring non-
resident defendants to litigate claims arising out of them. In Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia,83 the Supreme Court held that the state court
could exercise personal jurisdiction to enforce a foreign insurance com-
pany's compliance with state regulation of the sale of policies to its
residents. Although the Court emphasized the number of policies held
by forum residents, it would seem that, since the contracts were concluded
in the defendant's home state and its agents were never present in the
forum, the decision that each policy constituted a legally significant contact
was based upon the initial finding of a substantial state interest in this
product in Vermont. It is not clear whether the O'Brien court was correct in
requiring a causal relationship between the forum marketing and the injury, so long
as the defendant could have forseen that any of its products might cause a forum
injury. Compare Schutt v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Ass'n of America, 229
F.2d 158 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 940 (1956).
28 E.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Of course, in some cases, the emphasis on the place of
injury results from the court's effort to fit the facts within the words of the state
long-arm statute. See note 3 supra.
29 Compare O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963),
with Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
30205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
31116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951).
32 See also S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1954), appeal
dismnissed per stipulation, 348 U.S. 983 (1955). Howes, Compania De Astral, and
Smyth were cited with apparent approval by the Supreme Court in McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 n.2 (1957).
8339 U.S. 643 (1950).
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type of contract. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,3 4 the Court
disregarded the number of contacts and upheld jurisdiction over an insur-
ance company whose only policy issued in the forum was the one on which
the suit was brought.
A tort committed only incidentally to or outside the context of business
dealings,3 5 even when involving the defendant's presence in the forum,
should also require the presence of a substantial state interest to sustain
jurisdiction over a nonresident.3 6 In Hess v. Pawloski,3 7 the nonresident
motorist case, the Supreme Court was faced with this issue, and there, as
in Travelers Health and McGee, the defendant's activity was subject to the
traditionally recognized regulatory power of the forum state. However,
the Court has more recently suggested that a lesser interest may sufficiently
justify the result in Hess: the state's interest in providing its citizens with
opportunities for redress in an area in which the potentiality of injury is
so great.3 8 Such an interest might also be found to exist in cases involving
the sale of unwholesome food products or those "inherently dangerous"
products or activities which are likely to cause injury even in the absence
of defects or negligence.3 9
The court in the present case seemed to assert a state interest concept
of broader application:
Of paramount importance, no doubt, is the fact that an instrument
dangerous to human life and health, if defective, is involved. Due
process considerations would undoubtedly be more restrictive if
there were involved simply a dispute of commercial dimensions
between parties to a commercial contract.
40
There would appear to be no valid distinction on grounds of "dangerous-
ness" between the noumechanical hammer involved in the present case and
the multitude of other products sold in interstate commerce which, if
defective, might cause personal injury. Although a distinction between this
case and one in which the same product caused property damage seems
unreasonable,41 the present court was probably correct in implying that,
34 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
35 The commercial element-the fact that the defendant receives financial profit
from its activities in the forum, as well as "the benefits and protections of its laws"
-is clearly an important factor in the Supreme Court's application of the minimum
contacts test. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 646 (1950);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313-14, 320 (1945); Kurland,
mupra note 6, at 608.
36 See Note, 104 U. PA. L. R-v. 381, 387-90 (1955).
37274 U.S. 352 (1927) ; see text accompanying note 7 .mpra.
38 Olberding v. Illinois Cent. RLtR, 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953). Compare note
21 supra.
39 See Chovan v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 217 F. Supp. 808, 813 (D.
Mich. 1963); Velandra v. Regie Nationale des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292, 298
(6th Cir. 1964) (dictum).
4 0 Instant case at 292, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
4 1 See, e.g., Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124
N.W2d 824 (1963).
1965]
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if the retailer were seeking commercial damages upon discovery of the
defect, the case would be different.42
The rationale which the present court-and other authorities which
have asserted such a distinction -- might be searching for is one which
seems to lie at the basis of the Supreme Court's determination of state
interest in the cases involving securities, insurance policies, and automobile
accidents: that of protecting private citizens of the forum in situations
where, in practice, they have no choice but to submit to any possible
wrongs the defendant might inflict on them, where the defendant alone is
in a position to prevent the injury from occurring, and where the prob-
ability of injury which might otherwise go unredressed is relatively great.
Thus the average consumer is incapable of determining whether a product
he purchases is defective, and, considering the probability that he will no
more have the means to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction than the average
purchaser of insurance," the state might validly assert an interest in
providing him with redress, as to either personal or property injury, in
the forum in which he resides.
Such an interest would encompass all products liability cases brought
by noncommercial resident consumers. Thus, weighting this interest as
heavily as the state interests previously recognized by the Supreme Court
would seem to require the recognition of the state's power to exercise
jurisdiction over any foreign manufacturer who sold even one item to a
forum resident, since that defendant's contacts with the forum would be
at least as substantial as those in McGee. Given the unreasonable burden
which would thereby be imposed on many defendants, 45 as well as the
far less serious and pervasive problem created by the sale of consumer
products as compared with unregulated insurance companies or motorists,4
state interest, though relevant, should be of less significance in the applica-
42See Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv.
909, 937 (1960).
4 3 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFLicr OF LAWS, Explanatory Notes § 84,
comment c at 91 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
44 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) ; Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950). A large probability that liti-
gation outside the forum might be prohibitively expensive for plaintiffs bringing a
particular type of claim would thus be relevant to state interest. See note 21 supra.
45 Consider, for example, the mail-order house which sends one catalogue across
the country, receiving a single order for a low-priced product which turns out to be
defective and causes injury. The argument that allowing jurisdiction in such cases
will lead to frivolous or fraudulent suits is not entirely make-weight. See generally
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956)
(Sobeloff, J.); Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Non-Residents in Our
Federal System, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 196 (1957). In such a case the defendant will
have to appear specially to contest jurisdiction or otherwise take a chance on a
default judgment which may be enforced by the courts of his home state. In addition
the defendant may be prejudiced by the peculiar circumstance that litigation of the
jurisdictional issue under a single-act statute will probably involve at least partial
litigation of the substantive claim, since it is primarily upon the commission, for
example, of the tort itself that jurisdiction is based. Cf. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.
2d 378, 391-94, 143 N.E.2d 673, 680-81 (1957).46 See id. at 389, 143 N.E2d at 679.
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tion of the minimum contacts test where nonregulated activities result in
injuries to forum residents.
47
In viewing the contacts in the present case, the court asserted that
"the fact that the infant plaintiff obtained possession of the hammer in
New York is an essential nexus to sustain jurisdiction." 48 However, since
the essential contact was the circulation of the hammer in the New York
market, there would seem to be no basis for distinguishing between this
case and a case in which the resident plaintiff 49 obtained possession out-
side New York.60 In either situation the contact out of which the
plaintiff's claim arose would remain equally tenuous.5 1 If the sale or
circulation of a single hammer were the only contact with the forum state,
it would seem that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant would
violate due process, since the benefit gained from the single sale would
be so slight that liability in a foreign court for serious personal injuries
could hardly be viewed a reasonable consequence of that contact alone.
However, in the present case the volume of defendant's sales to
retailers provided a substantial economic benefit and increased the prob-
ability that the defendant might incur liability in the forum or find it
necessary to enforce claims of its own there. Furthermore, the defendant
sent salesmen and mailed catalogues into New York to solicit orders.
Treating these additional contacts as relevant to the constitutional issue,
52
even though they are not required by the applicable statute, the exercise
of jurisdiction over the defendants in the present case appears to be within
the bounds of due process.
47See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CoNFLicr or LAWS, Explanatory Notes § 84,
comment c at 91 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956). Some authorities have questioned the
validity of relying on state interest delineated by the traditional regulatory power of
states. The Supreme Court of Illinois has implied that such a distinction is without
constitutional significance and that the state legislature, out of concern for the redress
of its citizens' injuries, may declare itself "interested" in any type of claim it wishes
through jurisdiction statutes. See Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 389, 143 N.E.2d
673, 679 (1957). However, such an approach would reduce the state interest concept
to an irrelevancy with respect to the due process issue, a result clearly negated by
the Supreme Court's decisions in Travelers Health and McGee. But see Cleary,
The Length of the Long Arm, 9 J. Pui. L. 293, 297 (1960).4
8 Instant case at 290, 250 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
49 On the other hand, the instant case should also be indistinguishable from one
in which the original purchaser, in this case the plaintiff's aunt, suffered the injury.
50 See 64 COLUm. L. REv. 1354, 1356-57 (1964). But see 33 FORDHAm L. Rxv.
327, 335-36 (1964).
61 The New York long-arm statute in the instant case is typical of many state
statutes in providing for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary
"if, in person or through an agent, he: 1. transacts any business within the state
. . " N.Y. Cir. PRAc. LAW & RULES § 302(a). The court in the instant case
did not consider the possibility of affirming jurisdiction under this clause of the
statute, apparently because such a clause is generally construed as requiring that the
transaction be a substantial one, involving the defendant's presence in the forum state.
See, e.g., Kaye-Martin v. Brooks, 267 F.2d 394 (7th Cir.), cert. deoded, 361 U.S. 832
(1959) ; Grobark v. Addo Mach. Co., 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959) ; Longines-
Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 21 App. Div. 2d 474, 751 N.Y.S.2d
740 (1964).
52 Several courts have done so. See, e.g., Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia,
339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950) ; Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Prods. Co., 89 F. Supp. 654
(D..Md. 1950); cf. Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 185 F.
1965]
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TAXATION-PAYMENTS oF TREBLE DAMAGES IN PRIVATE ANTI-
TRUST SUITS RULED DEDUCTIBLE AS "ORDINARY AND NECESSARY"
BUSINESS EXPENSES
The Internal Revenue Service, at the request of taxpayers who had
paid treble damages for fixing prices of electrical equipment in violation of
the Sherman Act, issued a revenue ruling declaring that payments to
private parties resulting from antitrust treble damage suits are deductible
as an "ordinary and necessary" business expense. The Commissioner
concluded that payments of treble damages were restitutional, not punitive,
and that such payments accordingly were deductible under the well-
established policy of exempting payments of restitutional damages if other-
wise "ordinary and necessary." Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964 INT. REv. BULL.
No. 33, at 13.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act prescribes treble damages for private
parties injured "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws." 1
The courts, in considering the tax deductibility of business payments allied
with "unlawful" activities, have developed three patterns. Reparational
payments, if sufficiently connected with taxpayer's business, have been
considered "ordinary and necessary" business expenses, which are properly
deductible.2 Deductions have also been allowed as "ordinary and necessary"
business expenses where payments have been made in the normal course
of an illegal enterprise--for example, office rent paid by a bookmaking
establishment.8 However, where in the course of a business, legal or
illegal, penalties or fines have been paid for doing an unlawful act, such as
a trucker's fines for violating maximum weight laws, no deduction has
been permitted.4
The courts have justified the variant result reached in the third situa-
tion on the basis of public policy.; Since penalties and fines are intended
to be punitive, public policy, as evidenced by legislative expression, would
be frustrated by interpreting the Internal Revenue Code to mitigate
this punishment. If the deduction of such a payment would thwart this
Supp. 48 (S.D. Tex. 1960). See generally Foster, supra note 15, at 554-58, 578-79,
581.
Such an approach is also reflected in some state long-arm statutes, e.g., Wis.
STAT. ANN. §262.05(4) (Supp. 1965), as well as in the UNIFORM INTERSTATE &
INTERNATIONAL PROcmU AcT § 1.03(4), which authorizes the exercise of juris-
diction over a defendant who causes "tortious injury in this state by an act or omis-
sion outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any
other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used
or consumed or services rendered, in this state."
138 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
2 See Ditmars v. Commissioner, 302 F2d 481, 485 (2d Cir. 1962); accord, Hel-
vering v. Hampton, 79 F.2d 358, 359 (9th Cir. 1935).
3 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958) ; see, e.g., Commissioner v. Doyle,
231 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1956) (gambling business rent payment held deductible).
4 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
5 See, e.g., ibid.; Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 38
(1958) ; Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943) ; cf. Textile Mills See.
Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941) ; Dixie Mach. Welding & Metals Works,
Inc.-v. United States, 315 F2d 439 (5th Cir. 1963); Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc. v.
Coriinissioner, 25 T.C. 43 (1955).
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public policy, the courts reason that the payment itself cannot be "neces-
sary," and thus is not deductible as an "ordinary and necessary" business
expense.6 In contrast the payment of office rent, even in an illegal
business, is not a punishment. Accordingly, no such public policy is
frustrated by allowing the payments to be deducted, for the eventual
punishment for the substantive crime is in no way mitigated.7
The Comnmissioner contends that the payment of private treble dam-
ages does not fall within the punitive category and thus should be deduc-
tible, tacitly assuming such payments to be otherwise "ordinary and
necessary." 8  However, there are strong reasons for concluding that the
overall structure and purpose of antitrust law necessitates classifying at
least two-thirds of such payments as "punitive."
In adopting the "treble damage" measure for antitrust recovery,9
Congress appears to have incorporated the historical punitive connotations
associated with the "treble standard" since the original British Statute of
Monopolies of 1623.10 American antitrust legislation, like the Statute of
Monopolies, conceives of monopolists as intentionally harming competitors
in order to accrue economic power and thus imposes on them punitive
treble damages.1
The legislative history of section 4 supports the contention that the
private treble damage suit was intended not only to create a civil remedy
for the injured, but primarily to provide a deterrent for the wrongdoer.
Representative Culberson, who introduced the first antitrust treble damage
section, asserted: "[T]his bill allows a punitory verdict to be rendered;
that is to say . . . a reasonable attorney's fee [and] . . . treble
damages." 2 Since 1914, when the Clayton Act treble damage section
gTank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33 (1958).
7 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28 (1958); see Comment, Business
Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems of Sanctioning With
the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 108 (1962).8 Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 33, at 15.
9 Congress adopted the first treble damage provision as § 7 of the Sherman Act
in 1890, 26 Stat 210 (1890). It was soon supplanted by § 4 of the Clayton Act which
includes both Sherman and Clayton Act violations. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1958). Section 7 was repealed and superseded by § 4 under the Act of July 7,
1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283.
1o In the common-law setting of the statute, such multiple damages were punitive.
For example, under the common law a landlord could usually collect only actual dam-
ages from his tenant for disregard of the quiet enjoyment of the lease. However,
-when the disregard was intentionally effected, the landlord could recover double or
even treble damages, a punishment for the tenant. See, e.g., Kuiken v. Garrett, 243
Iowa 785, 51 N.W.2d 149 (1952). The Case of Monopolies (Darcy v. Allein), 77
Eng. Rep. 1260 (K. B. 1602), prompted the legislature to include such punitive multi-
plication of damages in the 1623 Statute of Monopolies as a statutory penalty. See
ScHXvARTZ, FREE ENTFRPRISE AND EcoNomic ORGANIZATION 12 (2d ed. 1959).
11 Section 4 of the Clayton Act specifically provides treble damage suits for vio-
lations of all antitrust laws. As Representative Robert N. Page said in an address
to the House on § 4 of the pending Clayton Act: "Privileges of monopoly . . .
were terminated by the wrath of the people in the enactment of the statute of monopo-
lies in 1624. Our antitrust act is but the outgrowth of the spirit against monopolies
which secured the passage of these ancient laws." 50 CONG. REc. 6540 (1913).
' 21 CONG. R c. 4091 (1890).
Congress did not use the express words "fine or penalty" in § 4, as it did in the
sections providing for suit by the Government, since in 1890 the concern was in
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was adopted, the private suit has been characterized as an appendage of
the government criminal prosecution.18 In 1955, when the two sections
were combined into section 4 of the Clayton Act, Congress reaffirmed the
punitive purpose of the treble damage suit.' 4 Judicial interpretation con-
tinues to reinforce this position.' 5
The courts, however, have held that for tax purposes only those
"penalties" directly associated with law enforcement fall within the "puni-
tive" category.' 6 In Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner,17 the Second
Circuit created an ad hoc test for evaluating the relationship between the
payment and the method of enforcing the statute or law in question.' s In
that case taxpayer corporation, which had inadvertently collected over-
charges in violation of ceiling prices of the Emergency Price Control Act, 9
was assessed a sum to be paid in this situation to the Government in lieu
of the unavailable private parties.20  In accordance with practice which
was later codified in the proviso of section 205(e) of the Price Control
Act,2 ' the OPA Administrator was enforcing the statute by assessing
inadvertent violators only actual damages, while subjecting willful violators
to treble damages.22 Applying its ad hoc test, the court concluded on the
keeping state courts open to private antitrust complainants. 21 CONG. REc. 4089
(1890). States could refuse to enforce federal "penal" suits if the penalty contravened
state public policy; however, they could not refuse if the action was not formally a
public penalty. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 672 (1892) (dictum). For a
discussion of this point, see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), which concluded
there was no distinction. Huntington v. Attrill, supra at 672, the primary case on
which the Commissioner relies in his ruling, 1964 INT. REv. BuL.. No. 33, at 15, is
concerned with just this distinction, i.e., between penal actions which the states were
obliged to enforce and those they were not.
I3 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936).
14 See S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955).
15 "[T]he private right of action for treble-damages . . . supplied much of the
teeth behind the federal government's attempt to eliminate anti-competitive practices
and to free our economic system from the devitalizing influences of monopoly." Mon-
arch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1963) ;
cf. Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 264-65 (9th Cir. 1964); Osborn v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 324 F.2d 566, 572 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Kennear-Weed Corp. v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 214 F.2d 891, 893 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912 (1955).
16 See Note, Deductibility of Penalty Payments as Expenses, 59 YALE L.J. 561,
562 (1950). Compare Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 38
(1958), with Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 93-98 (1952).
17 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
'Isd. at 713 (L. Hand, J.): "[W]hether the claimed deduction be of legal
expenses or of fines or forfeitures, its allowance depends upon the place of sanctions
in the scheme of enforcement of the underlying act . . . We hold therefore that in
every case the question must be decided ad hoc."
'9 Act of June 30, 1944, ch. 325, 58 Stat. 640.
20 The distinction between payments made to private parties and those made
directly to the Government was emphasized in the present ruling. 1964 INT. Ray.
BwI.. No. 33, at 14. The IRS recently re-emphasized this point by withdrawing its
acquiescence from the Tax Court's decision in Longhorn Cement Co., 3 T.C. 310
(1944), that legal expenses of defending a state antitrust action were deductible.
Acquiescence was withdrawn since the fines were to be paid to the State government.
1965 INT. REv. Bu.. No. 1, at 11.
2 Act of June 30, 1944, ch. 325, 58 Stat 640.
2 2 Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711, 714 (2d Cir. 1949);
accord, National Brass Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 182 F2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1950).
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basis of the Administrator's procedure that payments by inadvertent
violators not intended to contribute significantly to the enforcement of the
statute were not penalties for income tax purposes and hence were
deductible.28  In Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,24 the Supreme
Court approved and applied this test of ad hoc evaluation.2 5 The penalty
in Tank Truck for violating a maximum weight law was distinguished
from that in Rossman on the ground that it played a more significant and
direct role in deterring violations of the statute.26
In the present ruling the Commissioner contends that private antitrust
treble damages are not directly connected with law enforcement since paid
to private parties, and thus even under the ad hoc standard should be
deductible 27 Such a contention seems uniquely inapplicable to private
antitrust damages, since they play such an integral role in government
enforcement. In its most recent revision of the Clayton Act, Congress
categorically reaffirmed its belief that "the most effective method [of en-
forcing the antitrust laws], in addition to the imposition of penalties by the
United States, was to provide for private treble damage suits." 28 Accord-
ingly, provisions were made to "encourage private litigants," 29 for the
cumulative effect of an increased number of suits would be an increasingly
effective enforcement. Under section 5 (a) of the Clayton Act,30 govern-
ment-gained convictions are designated acceptable as "prima facie evidence"
against defendants in private damage suits.3 1  Section 5(b) 32 suspends
the statute of limitations for the duration of the government case and for
one year thereafter, allowing more litigants to use the fruits of government
prosecutions.33
Although the multiplication of damages is in itself clearly punitive,
courts have often separated the total award into a reparational one-third
and a punitive two-thirds.34 This analysis suggests that the "frustration
of public policy" rationale, based as it is on the penalty concept, is applicable
only to two-thirds of the assessment, and that one-third at least is thus
2 3 Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 22, at 714.
24356 U.S. 30 (1958).25 Id. at 36-37.
26 Ibid.
27 1964 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 33, at 15.
28S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1955). As the report notes, the ease
with which private suits may be brought was intended to decrease government time
and expense and thus increase the effectiveness of the Government as a punishing
agency. Id. at 3.
29Id. at 4.
30 69 Stat 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1958).
81 Congress had the additional purpose of using the threat of subsequent treble
damage actions to encourage settlements by consent suit and thus exempted consent
suits from § 5(a). 51 CONG. REc. 15824 (1914) (remarks of Senator Lewis).
3269 Stat 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1958).
33 S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1955) ; see ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. No. 169, at B-1 (Oct. 6, 1964). It is interesting to note that eighteen of the
twenty-four antitrust cases before the Supreme Court this term will be private treble
damage suits. Ibid.
34 See, e.g., Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1945);
Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 186 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Ohio 1960);
cf. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885).
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deductible.35 However, it could be argued that the "compensatory" one-
third is at once reparational and punitive. For the injured party, one-third
would be compensation, two-thirds a windfall; but for the wrongdoer, the
treble damage would be considered unitary, the product of a fixed statutory
formula-"threefold the damages"--constituting a single penalty to deter
him from future violations.36
Thus at least two-thirds of the treble damage fall squarely within the
"punitive" category, often described as "'the most important pillar of
antitrust enforcement.' "a7 As the Chairman of the Monopoly and Anti-
trust Subcommittee responded to the present ruling: "By allowing tax relief
for the damages, IRS seems to have lowered the penalty to double damages,
at most, instead of treble damages which Congress has provided to punish
the violators and to deter others from antitrust violations." 3 8 Such
mitigation of a payment designed and used to enforce a statute is the very
"frustration" of public policy which the courts have forbidden.39
35 For the treatment of the damages as income to the injured party, see, e.g.,
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); Raytheon Prods. Corp.
v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944).
86 The trebling of antitrust damages is automatic and thus differentiated from the
slander or libel situation, where a jury at its discretion may award exemplary damages
which fortuitously may amount to three times the actual damage. In U.S. ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT (1955),
the majority of the Committee suggested that Congress provide for discretionary
instead of automatic trebling of damages. Id. at 378-79. Although adopting many
of the Committee's suggested amendments as to § 5, Congress did not adopt the
discretionary trebling suggestion.
Where treble damages payable to the Government are nondeductible, the whole
amount has been held nondeductible. See A. D. Juilliard Co. v. Johnson, 166 F. Supp.
577 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). For cases holding that settlements made prior to trial of actions
for treble damages are to be treated the same as treble damages and thus nondeduc-
tible, see, e.g., Joseph Salzman, 21 T.C. 777 (1954); Watterson Hotel Co., 15 T.C.
902 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 539 (1952); Garibaldi & Cuneo Co., 9 T.C.
446 (1947) ; Scioto Provision Co., 9 T.C. 439 (1947).
In Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1941), and Chatta-
nooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906), cited by the Com-
missioner in support of the present ruling, the Court held that the multiplicatory
private damage suit involved was not a suit for a penalty. However, in Overnight
Motor the statute specifically identified the double damage as "liquidated damages."
In Chattanooga, the Court relied on the local construction that treble damages came
neither within the "penalty" nor within the "personal or property injury" clauses of
the Tennessee statute of limitation but rather within the dragnet clause "all other
not provided for." The opinion does not allude to what decision would have been
reached if there were no dragnet clause, if the choice was simply between "penalty"
and "reparation." When confronted by the choice, the courts of appeals have split.
Compare Baldwin v. Loew's, Inc., 312 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1963) (penalty), with
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1964) (civil
action). This disagreement has led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Leh v.
General Petroleum Corp., 330 F.2d 288 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 379 U.S. 877 (1964)
(No. 348).3 7
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 169, at B-1 (Oct. 6, 1964) (quoting former
Assistant Attorney General Lee Loevinger).
38joint Statement of Representative Emanuel Celler (New York) and Senator
Phillip Hart (Michigan), Aug. 21, 1964. The present ruling has caused additional
foment in Congress: the Joint Committee of Internal Revenue Taxation announced
a study of the ruling which could take two forms-a revocation of the ruling or legis-
lative addition to the antitrust laws. 1964 TAx MANAGEMENT MEM. No. 26, at 7.
In 1950 Congress made such an addition to the Price and Wage Stabilization Title
of the Korean Defense Act, § 104(1), 65 Stat; 136 (1951).
39 See Barber, "Windfall for Conspiracy," The Nation, Nov. 9, 1964, p. 333.
